52. "Foreword," forthcoming in S. Macrine and J. Fugate (eds.), Movement Matters: How Embodied Cognition Informs Teaching and Learning (Cambridge: MIT Press).

​

51. "Rethinking the Unity of Science Hypothesis: Levels, Mechanisms, and Realization," forthcoming in O. Shenker (ed.), Levels of Reality (Switzerland: Springer).

​

50. "Embodied Cognition", with Shannon Spaulding, in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2021(https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/embodied-cognition/).

​

49. "Structural and Indicator Representations: A Difference in Degree, Not Kind," with Greg Nirshberg, Synthese 198: 7647-7664, 2021.

 

48. “Foundations of Philosophical Functionalism,” forthcoming in Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Psychology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 1-17, 2020).

 

47. “Theories of Multiple Realization,” American Philosophical Quarterly 57: 17-30, 2020.

​

46. “A Tale of Two Explanatory Styles in Cognitive Science,” Theory and Psychology 29: 719-735, 2019.

 

45. “Embodied Cognition and its Significance for Education,” with Steven Stolz, Theory and Research in Education 17: 19-39, 2019.

 

44. “Matters of the Flesh: The Role(s) of the Body in Cognition,” in M. Colombo, E. Irvine, and M. Stapleton (eds.), Andy Clark and His Critics (New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 69-80, 2019).

 

43. “Embodied Cognition and Sport,” with Shannon Spaulding, in Cappuccio, M. (ed.), Handbook Of Embodied Cognition and Sport Psychology (Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 3-21, 2019).

 

42. “Flesh Matters: The Body in Cognition,” Mind and Language 34: 3-20, 2019.

 

41. “In Defense of Interventionist Solutions to Exclusion,” with Thomas Polger and Reuben Stern, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 68: 51-57, 2018.

 

40. “Reduction Redux,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 68: 10-19, 2018

 

39. “Response to Critics: A Symposium on The Multiple Realization Book,” Philosophical Psychology 31: 446-457, 2018.

 

38. “Mechanism or Bust? Explanation in Psychology,” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68: 1037-1059, 2017.

 

37. “Miracles and Justification,” in Reason and Responsibility, J. Feinberg and R. Shafer-Landau (eds.). (Boston: Wadsworth, 2016).

 

36. “The Irrationality of Belief in Miracles,” Slate Magazine, 2015 (http://www.slate.com/bigideas/are-miracles-possible/essays-and-opinions/larry-shapiro-opinion)

 

35. “When is Cognition Embodied?,” in Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind, U. Kriegel (ed.) (New York: Routledge, pp. 73-90, 2014).

 

34. “Don’t Believe in Miracles,” Aeon Magazine, 2013 (http://aeon.co/magazine/altered-states/dont-believe-in-miracles/).

 

33. “Embodied Cognition: Lessons from Linguistic Determinism,” Philosophical Topics 39: 121-140, 2013.

 

32. “Dynamics and Cognition,” Minds & Machines 23: 353-375, 2013.

 

31. “What’s New about Embodied Cognition?,” Filosofia Unisinos 13 (2-supplement): 214-224, 2012.

 

30. “Identity, Variability, and Multiple Realization in the Special Sciences,” with Thomas Polger, in New Perspectives on Type Identity, Christopher Hill and Simone Gozzano (eds). (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 264-287, 2012).

 

29. “Against Proportionality,” with Elliott Sober, Analysis 72: 89-93, 2012.

 

28. “Embodied Cognition,” in the Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science, E. Margolis, R. Samuels, and S. Stich (eds.) (New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 118-147, 2012).

 

27. “Mental Manipulations and the Problem of Causal Exclusion,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90: 507-524, 2012. Translated into Portuguese in Controvérsia, a journal of UNISINOS.

 

26. “Lessons from Causal Exclusion,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81: 594-604, 2010.

 

25. “James Bond and the Barking Dog: Evolution and Extended Cognition” Philosophy of Science 77: 400-418, 2010.

 

24. “Making Sense of Mirror Neurons,” Synthese 167: 439-456, 2008.

 

23. “How to Test for Multiple Realization,” Philosophy of Science 75: 514-525, 2008.

 

22. “Understanding the Dimensions of Realization,” with Thomas Polger, The Journal of Philosophy 105: 213-222, 2008. 

 

21. “Evolutionary Psychology,” in the online Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

 

20. “Functionalism and Mental Boundaries,” Cognitive Systems Research 9: 5-14, 2008.

 

19. “Symbolism, Embodied Cognition, and the Broader Debate,” in M. de Vega, A. Glenberg & A. Graesser (eds) Symbols and Embodiment: Debates on Meaning and Cognition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 57-74, 2008).

 

18. “The Embodied Cognition Research Programme,” Philosophy Compass 2: 338-346, 2008.

 

17. “Epiphenomenalism – The Dos and Don'ts,” with Elliott Sober, in G. Wolters and P. Machamer (eds.), Thinking about Causes: From Greek Philosophy to Modern Physics (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, pp. 253-264, 2007).

 

16. “Reductionism, Embodiment, and the Generality of Psychology,” in H. Looren de Jong & M. Schouten (eds.), The Matter of the Mind (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, pp. 101-120, 2006).

 

15. “Can Psychology Be a Unified Science?” Philosophy of Science 72: 953-963, 2005.

 

14. “Adapted Minds,” in J. McIntosh (ed.), Naturalism, Evolution, and Intentionality: Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary vol. 27 (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2001: 85-101).

 

13. “Mind the Adaptation,” in D. Walsh (ed.), Naturalism, Evolution, and Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001: 23-41).

 

12. “Multiple Realizations,” The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 97, no. 12, pp. 635-654, 2000.

 

11. “Presence of Mind,” in V. Hardcastle (ed.), Biology Meets Psychology: Constraints, Connections, Conjectures (Cambridge: MIT Press: 83-98, 1999).

 

10. “Evolutionary Theory Meets Cognitive Psychology: A More Selective Perspective,” (with William Epstein) Mind and Language vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 171-194, 1998.

 

9. “Do’s and Don’ts for Darwinizing Psychology,” in C. Allen and D. Cummins (eds.), The Evolution of Mind (New York: Oxford University Press: 243-259, 1998).

 

8. “The Nature of Nature: Rethinking Naturalistic Theories of Intentionality,” Philosophical Psychology, vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 309-322, 1997.

 

7. “Junk Representations,” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, vol. 48, no. 3, pp. 345-361, 1997.

 

6. “A Clearer Vision,” Philosophy of Science, vol. 64, no. 1, pp. 131-153, 1997.

 

5. “Representation from Bottom and Top,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 26, no. 4, pp. 523-542, 1996.

 

4. “What is Psychophysics?,” in D. Hull, M. Forbes, and R. M. Burian (eds.), PSA 1994, vol. 2 (East Lansing, MI: Philosophy of Science Association:  47-57). 

 

3. “Behavior, ISO Functionalism, and Psychology,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, vol. 25, no. 2, pp. 191-209, 1994.

 

2. “Content, Kinds, and Individualism in Marr’s Theory of Vision,” The Philosophical Review, vol. 102, no. 4, pp. 489-513, 1993.

 

1. “Darwin and Disjunction: Foraging Theory and Univocal Assignments of Content,” in D. Hull, M. Forbes and K. Okruhlik (eds.), PSA 1992, vol. 1 (East Lansing, MI: Philosophy of Science Association: 469-480).